In this paper we assess, through a financial measure (Net Present Value Ratio), the extent of the lifetime earning redistribution operated by the Notional Defined Contribution in a sample of individuals representative of the Italian population born from 1975 to 2000. Controlling mortality by the level of education we identify at least three channels of redistribution: among genders (from men to women), along educational lines (from low to high educated) and among income quintiles (from poor to rich). This happens because some groups systematically live less than average (men, loweducated and poor) while others live more than average (women, high educated and rich). This finding is not trivial: even if the NDC system assure long term financial sustainability, it harms the most disadvantaged groups like poor and low-educated people.
Introduction
The 1995 reform of the Italian Social Security System introduced a notional defined contribution (NDC) system that will have important consequences both under the macroeconomic point of view, ensuring in the long run the system financial sustainability, and under the microeconomic point of view, affecting future both retirees' income distribution and individual's retirement decisions.
In the economic literature the NDC system is considered to be "actuarially fair" (or, fairer than a defined benefit one) [Castellino and Fornero 2001] : it should equalize, for each individual, the present value of benefits (PVB) to the present value of contributions (PVC). Once an individual reaches the retirement age, his/her cumulated contributions are converted into a stream of monthly benefits according to a conversion factor: under the Italian law (L. 335/95) this factor called "coefficiente di trasformazione" (common for both sexes and forecasted to change every ten years in order to compensate expected increase in life expectancies) takes into account the average life expectancy at retirement age. However, since the PVB depends on the actual life length at retirement, actuarial fairness, among individuals that belong to a certain generation, will occur only for those who happen to live as long as the average individual does. For the others, the system is "unfair": the pensioners who die earlier then the mean will incur in a "waste" of resources, while those who die later will have a "gain" 1 .
Since life expectancy is affected by socio-economic determinants, like level of education, sex and occupational status, there are groups of individuals whose life expectancy is higher or lower than the mean. In a certain sense this should not be a surprise since the inherently insurance characteristics of the NDC system. However there might be systematic, even . Actuarial fairness will be evaluated applying a new demographic module which explicitly takes into account the estimated differences in mortality due to educational attainment.
A first contribution of the paper is the building of differential mortality tables for Italy.
Secondly in order to assess the redistribution of lifetime resources within the NDC system in the presence of differential mortality we compute the Net Present Value Ratio (NPVR), defined as the ratio between the PVB and the PVC for each individual of the sample.
Controlling for educational level and for quintiles of Average Indexed
Yearly Income we find that the NDC system determines a substantial regressive redistribution of lifetime resources within each cohort and sex.
These results pose a problem under the economic policy point of view, since the NDC system ends up transferring money from poor and low educated people to rich and high educated ones: a result that contradicts not only the progressivity of the system but also its claimed neutrality.
Education and Differential Mortality
Mortality can be differentiated provided many socio-economic A first attempt to analyse life expectancy at certain age by level of education has recently been made by Maccheroni [2008] . He uses death certificate and census data as sources of information, and adopts econometric 3 There are only local longitudinal enquires, covering determined areas like Turin, Tuscany or Reggio-Emilia. 4 Crude rates are calculated dividing deaths occurred in a class of age by the relative stock of population. However, it could be tricky to make comparisons among different countries or group, because of (possible) different demographic structure of the population. For example, if a population is older than another one, it will show higher mortality rates, partly due to the different demographic structure and partly to the actual conditions of life. In order to avoid this bias, standardised rates are used: they say what the mortality rates would have been if the population's age distribution was equal to a standard population's distribution, previously defined. Standardised rates allow comparisons across space and along time. 5 The most accepted explanation calls the differences in the major causes of death in the two genders. Men's most common fatal disease, lung cancer, is negatively correlated with education, while women's one, breast tumour, is positively associated with educational level (probably because of the "renounce" to some protective factors, such as early pregnancy and breast-feeding [Candela S. et al. 2005] 
Mortality, Progressivity and Redistribution
The most used measure to judge the intergenerational redistribution where P ,t is the pension benefit at time t, S i,t represents the probability of living to period t, T is the maximum life span and r is the real discount rate.
The interpretation of (1.1) is straightforward: if NPVR equals to 1, in actuarial terms, the individual receives the same amount of money that he/she has paid as social security contributions. If NPVR is higher (smaller) than 1, the individual faces an expected gain (loss). Another way to look at this measure is to interpret it as the return of each present value euro paid (i.e., if NPVR equals to 0,91, it means that the individual will receive 91 cents back each euro he/she has contributed for).
The relation between differential mortality and returns form the Social Security system has been studied above all in the U.S. The public pillar of the U.S. pension system is formally progressive: it combines a flat payroll tax with a benefit formula which replaces a higher share of earnings for workers with low lifetime earnings. However, part of this progressivity can be offset by differential mortality: once the latter is taken into account, is the system still progressive? Liebman [2002] analyses the cohort born from 1925 to 1929 and estimates the internal rate 6 of return by sex, race and education. Main results of this work are displayed in Table 1 . 
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN (%)
Including mortality due to race and education With respect to the case of uniform mortality (second column), the introduction of differential mortality have significant effects on IRT of those people with higher mortality rates, such as blacks and low-educated 6 The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is defined as the rate that makes the present value of benefits equal to present value of contributions. IRR and NPVR provide the same information, since the IRR is the value of r that makes the NPVR in (1.1) equal to 1.
individuals. The former receive an IRT of 1,64% (it would have been 2,19%
if differential mortality had not had effects), the latter have a return of 1,63% The first thing to note is the large resource transfer from men to women:
because of different mortality, for every dollar paid to purchase the annuity, a man expects to receive 92 cents and a woman can expect $1,076. Large gaps arise even within racial groups: there are 10 points difference between top and bottom educated among white males, 6 points for white females, 11
and 8 points among, respectively, black males and females. Concluding, black men with less than High Schools are the largest "losers" (NPVR=0,800), while white graduated women are the largest "winners" (NPVR=1,106).
Outside U.S., Nelissen [1999] investigates Dutch case. Although Holland is among the countries with lowest differential mortality (along with Sweden, Denmark and Norway). He estimates that high-educated people have a life expectancy at birth 4,5 years higher than low-educated ones.
Therefore, an individual with a low educational level, compared with the average individual, faces a loss of 6% in his permanent income (lifetime earnings and pension benefits).
Turning to Italy, Caselli et al. [2003] study the link between life expectancy and conversion factors at regional level. They compare legislated factors (which guarantee actuarial fairness on average) with those that would be necessary to assure actuarial fairness in each of the four regions considered.
A positive (negative) deviation means that estimated-regional factors are higher (smaller) than legislated-national ones: it follows that these individuals' pensions should be higher (smaller) than the actual, in order to achieve actuarial fairness. Therefore, "loser" regions are Campania and Lombardy (whose estimated conversion factors are respectively 4% and 1,5% higher than legislated ones); Calabria roughly reflects Italian mortality, so its pensioners neither gain or lose with legislated factors; Tuscany shows negative deviation percentages that make its retirees the "winners" in the current pensions system. 
The model
All the simulations presented in this paper are performed using While the unit of simulation is the individual, we nevertheless keep information on family structure and any changes this may be subjected to over the course of time. All individuals in the sample are involved in a considerable number of demographic and economic events, such as birth, education, marriage, work, retirement and death. Economic and demographic transitions among states are simulated using Monte Carlo processes. A set of matrices and econometric models are employed to generate transition probabilities, so as to produce a lifetime pattern of education, work, career, personal and family income, and so on, for each individual in question. value is smaller than the age-cohort specific ISTAT death probability, then the model simulates death and consequently modifies the cohabitant's marital status. However, using differentiated mortality tables that we will describe in the next subsection, we are able to apply a different pattern of the mortality to individuals with respectively a low a middle and a high level of education. 
Differential mortality
Differential mortality tables are currently not available in Italy. This subsection describe the procedure adopted to estimate them from available data.
First, we compute group-specific crude mortality rates, using data from death certificates and labours surveys and controlling for sex and three different level of education; then, we estimate relative risks, dividing each group-specific mortality rate by the general mortality rate; finally, we obtain differentiated death probability multiplying our relative risks to the general age-related death probability. An important hypothesis has been introduced: mortality differentials, in relative terms, stay constant across all generations 8 .
Let x q be the death probability of a man 9 aged x , regardless of his education. We can write: RR represents the group-specific relative risk (for instance, the 70% more than average for an illiterate man, or the 30% less for a graduate)
for the age x, and the apexes , , e α β γ refer respectively to an individual with low, middle and high education.
The first step is to compute group specific mortality rates. Mortality rates are expressed as
where n is the number of deaths, p is the benchmark population, K is a proportionality factor (we set K=10.000), x refers to age and i to the educational level. 12 They usually last 3 years (instead of 5) and do not allow to enroll at University. 13 For a discussion on how to treat unknown data, see Maccheroni [2008, pp. 3-6] . Table 5 shows crude mortality rates computed in this way. Source: our calculation on ISTAT data Note: Ratio of subgroup male (female) mortality to general population male (female) mortality. Relative Risks of 1 are imputed for ages ranging from 100 to 120.
Each cell in table 6 says the subgroup percentage deviation from total population of a given age class in its mortality rate.
We now interpolate our data in order to obtain annual relative risks.
Graph 1 and Graph 2 show these figures for both sexes. The third step is to compute differentiated death probability, applying (1.2). This procedure enable us to take into account even the cohort effect, since x q depends on birth year as well, and we have assumed that RR are equals for all the generations considered. Let's note that in the dynamic simulation the model exploits ISTAT death probability official forecasts ).
Final step is purely computational, tough very important, and assures model's consistency. The point is that, year by year, the number of deaths simulated by the model must be the same whether differentiated or nondifferentiated rates apply. Otherwise, the differential mortality would imply a "deny" of the whole population's rates, which must be still valid. Therefore, the model implements this algorithm: it simulates and counts the number of deaths with undifferentiated mortality, and compares the number of deaths after having applied the differentiated rates. The benchmark is, of course, the former, and the latter is calibrated to match the benchmark. The model calculates the difference between the scenarios: if difference is positive, it means that differentiation has made not enough deaths; if it is negative, the experiment has made too many deceased. CAPP_DYN, in the first case, randomly generates further deaths among the survived; in the second it randomly makes the dead in excess "live again". Based on the procedure described above, we compute on our estimated differential mortality tables the theoretical life expectancy at birth and at 65 years old, by sex and education. Life expectancy 14 varies greatly between and within genders.
Irrespectively of education, life expectancy at birth is 77,6 years for men and 84 for women, while at 65 years old these values are 17,3 and 21,7.
Considering education, a man can expect to live 76,5 years if he has a low level of education and 82,6 years if he gets a degree, with a difference of 6,1 years. A woman without secondary education on average lives up 83,5 years that rise to 88,3 if she has graduated, with a difference of 4,8 years.
Obviously, gaps remain high even at 65 years old: between least and most educated there are 3,8 years of difference for both sexes.
These data roughly confirm those of Maccheroni [2001] , whose findings are here summarized above.
Main results
In order to asses the effects of the introduction of differential mortality on the distribution of lifetime resources under the NDC system we run the 14 Data in Table 7 have been obtained applying the usual formula: women. All findings and comments that follow are now referred to pensioners and not to general population. Table 8 shows average pensioners' death age in the panel. Results confirm figures of the table 7: life expectancy appears to be influenced both by sex and educational level. In particular a male pensioner born from 1975 to 2000 with less than High School expects to live on average 3,4 less than a graduate, while for women this difference is 2,7.
CAPP_DYN is based on a heterogeneous population so that we can focus not only on the average levels, but also on the whole distribution.
It can be useful to plot the frequencies of death age by educational level.
Since the existence of differentiated mortality tables, we can expect that the proportion of individuals died at very old age is higher among the most educated ones. We provide the analogous female graph: this time the relation between education and death age is even clearer. Moving to the analysis of the effects of differential mortality on the distribution of lifetime resources under the NDC system, Graph 5 plots, for the whole panel, the relation between NPVR and death age. As expected the NPVR displays a positive relation with the age of death.
It is interesting to notice that NPVR reaches the value of 1 at the age of 89, which is higher than the average life length. This can be explained by the fact that the transformation coefficients (used by the model to compute pension benefits) take into account the expected survival benefits, whereas our computations of NPVR do not 15 . that the NDC system is less generous than the previous defined-benefits system, and that the transition generates a burden weighting on the future pensioners (present students and workers) 16 .
Graph 5 Relation between Net Present
Since NPVR depends on life length (see Graph 5), and since life length is affected by educational level (as we have seen in Table 8 ), we can expect the NPVR to be different provided education and, obviously, sex. Table 9 reports the main results of our simulation. We can identify two channels of redistribution: between genders (from man to women), and within genders (from low to high-educated people).
These effects can go in the same way, as in the case of graduate women:
their NPVR is higher than panel's NPVR both because they are female and because they are graduated. However, these effects could offset each other, as in the case of male graduated: because of their sex, they should have a NPVR minor than average, but because of their education it should be higher. The total effect is the sum of these two distinct phenomena. 17 In the simulation presented the discount rate is fixed at 1.5%. We run our simulation with interest rate of zero and 3%. In the former case, NPVR are extremely high, and in the latter extremely low but relive differences among educational level do not appear to be influenced by the choice of this parameter.
In Graph 6 we break down the total distribution in a part due to sex and in a part due to education 18 .
Graph 6 Percentage deviation from general NPVR, due to sex and education. Due to sex Due to education Total Black bars refer to total redistribution from social security system: males with less than High School are the largest "losers", having the NPVR 16% less than general average. This large difference depends for a 7% by sex (white bar) and for a 10%
19 by low education (grey bar). Taking a broader view, se see that sex effect stays constant at 7-8%, while education effect differs among groups. It matters most for the above cited poorly educated males (-10%) and least for females with High School (+1%).
A complete description of distribution of NPVR, both for men and women, is supported in Graph 7 and Graph 8. 18 Total distribution is obtained as the percentage difference between the individual NPVR and the panel's NPVR. Distribution due to education is obtained as the percentage difference between the individual NPVR and the general male and female NPVR. Difference due sex is obtained by subtraction (total minus education) 19 Because of rounding, total may not exactly be the sum of sex and education. We can see that the paths of lines in Graph 7 and Graph 8 are very similar to those in Graph 3 and Graph 4 (death age frequency density). This appears obvious once equation (1.1) is considered and Graph 5 is looked at.
As we have found, there is a certain degree of redistribution from low to high-educated people. However, since education is positively correlated with income, it is likely that social security system ends up redistributing resources from poor to rich.
In order to measure the potential system progressivity/regressivity of the NDC system, we classify individuals with respect to the Average Indexed Yearly Earnings 20 , defined as lifetime earnings divided by the number of years with positive earnings. smaller than those observed classifying individuals by level of education (see Table 9 ). Even in this case, it is possible to isolate the effect due to sex and the one due to wealth, as we show in Graph 9.
Graph 9 Percentage deviation from general NPVR, due to sex and income quintile. Men Women due to sex due to quintile total Analogously to Graph 6, white bars refer to redistribution due to sex, grey due to wealth and black bars represent the total percentage difference with respect general NPVR (0,935). The effect due to sex is constant at 7-8%, just like in Graph 6. We observe that wealth contributes for about 2-3% to the total percentage. For instance, poorest males have a NPVR 10% less than average: 7 points depends on sex, and 3 on standard of living. On the other hand, richest men have their NPVR 4% less than average: in this case the positive effect due to income (+3%) partly offsets the negative effect due to sex (-8%). For this aim we use CAPP_DYN, a dynamic microsimulation model able to forecast the long-term redistributive effects of fiscal policies.
Conclusion
After having reviewed the most important findings about the link between socioeconomic factors and differential mortality, and between differential mortality and actuarial fairness, we estimated mortality tables differentiated by sex and education. For example, we find that the average pensioners' death age was 82,5 years for a man with less than High School and 85,9 for a man with a university degree. Similar pattern were observed among women.
We identified at least three channels of redistribution: among genders (from men to women), along educational lines (from low to high educated) and among income quintiles (from poor to rich). This happens because some groups systematically live less than average (men, low-educated and poor) while others live more than average (women, high educated and rich).
For instance, for every euro paid at the social security system, a man can expect to receive 86,6 cents back, while a woman receives 100,1 cents back.
These figures become 78 and 95 cents for respectively low-educated men and women, and 90 and 104 cents for graduated men and women. Therefore, even within genders, we saw a strong redistribution from individuals with less than High School to those with secondary school or more.
Moreover, since education is positively correlated with income, it is likely that social security system ends up redistributing resources from poor to rich. In order to measure the potential system progressivity/regressivity, we classified individuals with respect the Average Indexed Yearly Earnings, defined as lifetime earnings divided by the number of years with positive earnings. We found the system to be regressive. A men belonging to 1 st quintile has a NPVR of 0,843, about 2,3 points less than average male NPVR (0,866) and 5 point less than the 5 th quintile (0,894). Turning to women, the poorest ones have 0,987 while the most affluent people 1,028.
We can conclude stating that, along with redistribution across educational lines, we find a regressive transfer, which penalises poor people.
Of course, this regressivity is unintended and is a necessary by-product of using uniform coefficients of transformation, which do not take into account sexual or social differences. However this finding is not trivial: even if the NDC system assures long run macroeconomic sustainability, it harms the most disadvantaged groups like poor and low-educated people.
